AT&T Stadium (Arlington, Texas, USA) FIFA World Cup 26 Threat Assessment
Security threat assessment for matches hosted at AT&T Stadium (Arlington, Texas, USA) during the FIFA World Cup 26. Threat assessment based on two years of historical crime and unrest data within 1.5 miles of venue and 0.5 miles of nearby transit hub.
World Cup 2025
December 10, 2025
Base Operations
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Event Venue: AT&T Stadium
1.5 Mile Radius
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BaseScore
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Top Threat Category
Transit Hub: CentrePort/DFW Airport Station
0.5 Mile Radius
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BaseScore
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Top Threat Category
Stadium BaseScore Threat Severity by Type
Transit Hub BaseScore Threat Severity by Type
Stadium Top 5 Crime Categories (Count)
Stadium Crime Time of Day Breakdown
Stadium Monthly Crime Trend (Average Events)
Strategic Intelligence & Guidance
Strategic Takeaways
Temporal Risk: Evening hours (6:00 PM - 11:59 PM) account for 39% of all validated threats. 35% of violent crime occurs during this timeframe, directly overlapping with match conclusions and VIP egress.
Spatial Risk: Significant threat disparity between AT&T Stadium (Medium Risk, BaseScore 45) and CentrePort/DFW Airport Station (Very Low Risk, BaseScore 20). Transit hub shows concentrated morning arrival risks.
Vehicle Security Criticality: 517 vehicle thefts and 243 theft-from-vehicle incidents validated within the stadium perimeter. Open-air parking configuration facilitates "smash-and-grab" tactics targeting electronics and luggage.
Corporate Security Director Guidance
Mandate Secure Transport: The 517 validated vehicle thefts necessitate the use of armored vehicles and secure, guarded parking for all VIP movements. Do not rely on public lots.
Schedule around Risk: Shift arrivals to the mid-morning window (10:00 AM - 12:00 PM) when threats decrease by 37%. Implement shelter-in-place protocols for post-match departures to avoid the 6:00 PM - 12:00 AM high-threat window.
Route Planning: The I-30 corridor and intersections of Collins Street and Randol Mill Road should be treated as red zones. Match day traffic projected to increase travel times by up to 200%.
Data Coverage Period: September 30, 2023 – September 30, 2025
Stadium Location: AT&T Stadium
Transit Hub Location: CentrePort/DFW Airport Station
Host City: Arlington, Texas
Methodology Disclaimer This assessment integrates Base Operations quantitative threat data with qualitative intelligence from open sources collected via deep research AI agents. Confidence levels reflect source reliability: High (government/Base Operations verified data), Medium (multiple corroborating sources), Low (single source/extrapolated). AI agents can provide incorrect or misleading information. To ensure up to date accuracy of stadium threat assessment, analyze the latest data in Base Operations.
2. Executive Summary
AT&T Stadium in Arlington, Texas, presents a Medium threat environment for the FIFA World Cup 2026, characterized by sustained property crime targeting vehicles and significant temporal vulnerabilities during evening operations. As the host of nine matches—the highest number of any single venue—security operations must sustain high-intensity protective measures over a 39-day period.
Base Operations validated threat intelligence indicates a clear dichotomy in risk profiles between the stadium and the primary transit hub. The stadium perimeter (1.5-mile radius) carries a BaseScore of 45 (Medium Risk) , driven by volume crimes such as trespassing, vehicle theft, and simple assault. Conversely, the CentrePort/DFW Airport Station presents a 20 (Very low Risk) BaseScore, though specific temporal analysis reveals concentrated risks during morning arrival windows.
Strategic Key Findings:
Vehicle Security Criticality: With 760 vehicle-related incidents validated within the stadium perimeter, including 517 vehicle thefts, ground transportation assets face a High Confidence threat. The absence of fixed mass transit forces reliance on private vehicles, exacerbating this vulnerability.
Temporal Vulnerability: Evening hours (6:00 PM – 11:59 PM) account for 39% of all threats near the stadium. This directly overlaps with match conclusions and VIP egress, creating a compounded security risk.
Infrastructure Dependencies: The reliance on the I-30 and Highway 360 intersection creates a single point of failure for logistics. Gridlock during match days (expected 100-200% delay increases) exposes principals to static environments vulnerable to opportunistic crime or targeted ambush.
3. Event Snapshot
Event Scope and Significance AT&T Stadium serves as a centerpiece for the FIFA World Cup 2026, hosting nine matches between June 11 and July 19, 2026. This schedule includes a high concentration of VIP attendance, particularly during the semifinal match scheduled for July 14, 2026. The concurrent U.S. Semiquincentennial celebrations on July 4, 2026, will likely strain regional security resources.
Venue Characteristics
Capacity: 80,000 (expandable to 100,000).
Type: Enclosed stadium with retractable roof.
Operational Precedent: Previous host of Super Bowl XLV and NCAA Final Four. However, the 39-day sustained duration of the World Cup exceeds all prior operational tempos for this venue (High Confidence).
VIP Profile Attendance will include federal, state, and local government dignitaries, alongside multinational corporate executives. The International Broadcast Center (IBC) in nearby Dallas adds a layer of high-value targets moving between the venue and support facilities.
4. Area & Infrastructure Overview
Geographic Context AT&T Stadium is situated within the Arlington Entertainment District, bordered by Globe Life Field and Six Flags Over Texas. This creates a dense "soft target" zone of commercial and entertainment infrastructure. The immediate perimeter is defined by expansive surface parking lots covering approximately 140 acres. While this allows for established security buffers, it necessitates extended pedestrian movements through open areas during ingress and egress.
Transportation Infrastructure Arlington is the largest municipality in the United States without a comprehensive fixed mass transit system.
Primary Arteries: Interstate 30 (East-West) and State Highway 360 (North-South).
Chokepoints: The I-30/Highway 360 interchange is a structural bottleneck. Match day traffic is projected to increase travel times by up to 200%.
Transit Hub: CentrePort/DFW Airport Station (15 miles northeast) serves as the primary rail link for executive arrivals via the Trinity Railway Express (TRE).
CentrePort Station (0.5-mile radius): BaseScore 20 (Very Low Risk). Total incidents: 145 (Nov 2024 - Oct 2025).
5. Historical Incident Review
Stadium-Specific Security Events Historical data highlights two primary vulnerability vectors: weather and parking lot security.
Super Bowl XLV (2011): Ice accumulation on the stadium roof resulted in falling debris that injured six people. While the stadium is enclosed, this incident underscores the venue's susceptibility to extreme weather events affecting the immediate perimeter (High Confidence).
2024 Post-Game Assault: A violent assault occurred in the parking lot at the intersection of Cowboys Way and AT&T Way following a Dallas Cowboys game. This incident validated the risk in pedestrian crossover zones during egress operations when security forces are often dilated (Medium Confidence).
Base Operations Historical Patterns Analysis of data from September 2023 to September 2025 reveals distinct seasonal trends.
Peak Threat Months: October (Average 289 incidents) and March (287 incidents).
Tournament Period: June and July average 278–286 monthly incidents. This places the tournament window in the upper-medium threat classification relative to the annual baseline.
Lowest Threat: November (255 incidents).
Global & Domestic Precedents
Soft Target Vulnerability: The 1996 Atlanta Olympics bombing and the 2017 Las Vegas shooting demonstrate the persistent threat to mass gatherings outside the hardened venue perimeter.
Medical Surge: The 2022 World Cup in Qatar required extensive heat mitigation. Arlington’s average highs of 93-96°F create similar medical surge risks (High Confidence).
6. Current Threat Landscape
6.1 Crime Trends & Opportunistic Threats
AT&T Stadium Vicinity (High BaseScore Risk) Base Operations validated threat intelligence (Sep 2023 – Sep 2025) recorded 6,677 incidents within the 1.5-mile assessment radius. The threat landscape is dominated by regulatory offenses and property crime.
Top Threat Categories:
Trespassing: 1,792 incidents (27% of total).
Serious Traffic Violations: 893 incidents (13%).
Simple Assault: 733 incidents (11%).
Theft: 653 incidents (10%).
Vehicle Theft: 517 incidents (8%).
Temporal Threat Distribution
Evening Peak (6:00 PM – 11:59 PM): This window accounts for 39% of all validated threats (2,443 incidents). Notably, 35% of all violent crime (518 incidents) occurs during this timeframe, aligning directly with match conclusions.
Morning Window: Conversely, morning hours account for only 19% of incidents, suggesting VIP movements should be front-loaded where possible.
Vehicle Crime Ecosystem The data confirms a sustained targeting of vehicles. 517 vehicle thefts and 243 theft-from-vehicle incidents occurred over the 24-month period. The open-air parking configuration facilitates "smash-and-grab" tactics targeting electronics and luggage, posing a direct risk to logistics and VIP support vehicles.
CentrePort/DFW Airport Station (Very Low BaseScore Risk) While the overall volume is lower (145 incidents), the temporal distribution is inverted compared to the stadium.
Morning Vulnerability: 63% of incidents (90 total) occur between 6:00 AM and 11:59 AM.
Crime Type: Property crime constitutes 68% of threats at this location.
6.2 Terrorism & Extremism
The Department of Homeland Security has designated the World Cup as a SEAR Level 1 event.
Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs): ISIS-inspired networks maintain explicit intent to target international sporting venues, viewing them as "soft targets" with global visibility.
Domestic Violent Extremists (DVEs): Racially Motivated Violent Extremists (RMVEs) represent the most violent domestic terrorism threat in Texas. Capabilities include firearms attacks and vehicle-as-weapon (VAW) tactics against infrastructure (High Confidence). The absence of permanent bollards in certain downtown Dallas and Arlington pedestrian zones remains a recognized gap.
6.3 Activist & Protest Activity
Protest activity is expected to concentrate on high-visibility nodes rather than the hardened stadium perimeter itself.
Targets: The International Broadcast Center (IBC) and the FIFA Fan Festival (Fair Park, Dallas).
Tactics: Disruption of transport chokepoints (I-30) and mass gatherings to maximize media coverage.
Incident Data: Base Operations recorded limited peaceful protest activity (9 incidents) in the stadium vicinity, suggesting the venue itself is not a primary historical focal point for unrest.
6.4 Cyber & Information Risks
The concentration of high-profile corporate sponsors and the IBC creates a dense target environment for cyber actors.
Threat Vectors: Ransomware attacks against critical infrastructure (power, transit signaling) and data theft targeting VIPs via public Wi-Fi or compromised hotel networks.
Precedent: The 2018 World Cup in Russia saw significant attempted cyber intrusions, which were successfully mitigated.
7. Threat Actor Profiles
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs)Risk Level: Medium-High Profile: TCOs operating in the North Texas region possess sophisticated capabilities, including potential AI-enhanced target profiling and established logistics networks. Their primary intent is financial gain through high-end theft, fraud, or extortion. They generally avoid high-visibility violence that attracts federal law enforcement, preferring low-profile targeting of vulnerable executives. Mitigation: Unpredictable movement patterns and encrypted communications.
Opportunistic Criminal NetworksRisk Level: Low-Medium Profile: These groups capitalize on high-density crowds and distracted security forces. Tactics include pickpocketing, bag snatching, and vehicle crimes. While less sophisticated, their high volume of activity poses the most frequent disruption risk to general operations and lower-tier VIPs. Mitigation: Situational awareness and secured, monitored parking.
8. Key Takeaways
9.1 Corporate Security Director
Mandate Secure Transport: The 517 validated vehicle thefts necessitate the use of armored vehicles and secure, guarded parking for all VIP movements. Do not rely on public lots.
Schedule around Risk: Shift arrivals to the mid-morning window (10:00 AM – 12:00 PM) when threats decrease by 37%. Implement shelter-in-place or secure holding protocols for post-match departures to avoid the 6:00 PM – 12:00 AM high-threat window.
Close Protection Focus: Executive protection teams must be briefed on the specific risk of "smash-and-grab" operations in the Arlington Entertainment District. Valuables must never be left in unattended vehicles.
9.2 Security Analyst
Data Integration: Incorporate the monthly Base Operations updates into threat models. Pay specific attention to the "Property Crime" category, which serves as a leading indicator for the overall security environment.
Hotspot Mapping: Overlay the BaseScore heatmap with planned VIP routes. The I-30 corridor and the specific intersections of Collins Street and Randol Mill Road should be treated as red zones for route planning.
Weather Monitoring: Integrate real-time weather data for heat index and severe storm warnings, as these environmental factors can rapidly degrade the security perimeter's integrity.
9. Appendices
Acronyms
DHS: Department of Homeland Security
DVE: Domestic Violent Extremist
FTO: Foreign Terrorist Organization
IBC: International Broadcast Center
RMVE: Racially or Ethnically Motivated Violent Extremist
SEAR: Special Event Assessment Rating
TCO: Transnational Criminal Organization
VAW: Vehicle-as-Weapon
Key Contacts
Federal: FBI Dallas Field Office (Counterterrorism & Criminal Divisions), DHS Dallas/Fort Worth Office, U.S. Secret Service Dallas Field Office.
State/Local: Texas Department of Public Safety, Arlington Police Department (Special Operations), Dallas Police Department (Special Events), DFW Airport Police.
Emergency/Venue: Arlington Fire Department, AT&T Stadium Security Operations Center.
Methodology
This assessment utilizes Base Operations’ proprietary threat scoring algorithms (BaseScore) combined with open-source intelligence analysis. Incident data is geolocated and categorized to provide granular risk assessments.
Data Limitations
Base Operations data current Data Coverage Period dates (September 30, 2023 – September 30, 2025 for Stadium; November 1, 2024 – October 31, 2025 for Hub). Cyber threats not captured in Base Operations metrics. Private security incidents may be underreported. Historical patterns may not predict novel threat vectors. This assessment represents analysis current as of the Date Assessment Prepared. Threat conditions may evolve rapidly. Continuous monitoring through Base Operations and coordination with law enforcement partners is essential for maintaining situational awareness throughout the tournament period.
10. References
Base Operations. AT&T Stadium 1.5-mile radius BaseScore data. Assessment Period: September 30, 2023 September 30, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. AT&T Stadium 1.5-mile radius Event Count by Threat Category. Assessment Period: September 30, 2023 - September 30, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. AT&T Stadium 1.5-mile radius Time of Day Breakdown - Primary Categories. Assessment Period: September 30, 2023 - September 30, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. AT&T Stadium 1.5-mile radius Monthly Event Trend - Event Count & Average. Assessment Period: September 30, 2023 - September 30, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. AT&T Stadium 1.5-mile radius Average Events by Month of Year. Assessment Period: September 30, 2023 - September 30, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. CentrePort/DFW Airport Station 0.5-mile radius BaseScore data. Assessment Period: November 1, 2024 October 31, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. CentrePort/DFW Airport Station 0.5-mile radius Event Count by Threat Category. Assessment Period: November 1, 2024 - October 31, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
Base Operations. CentrePort/DFW Airport Station 0.5-mile radius Time of Day Breakdown - Primary Categories. Assessment Period: November 1, 2024 - October 31, 2025. (Accessed November 2025)
U.S. Congress - House Hearing, Committee on Homeland Security. "America on the Global Stage: Examining Efforts to Secure and Improve the U.S. Travel System and Prepare for Significant International Events." Opening statement by Rep. Gimenez, October 2025. https://www.congress.gov (Accessed November 12, 2025)
Giles Alston. "US World Cup preparations will focus on security." Oxford Analytica Daily Brief. Published October 23, 2025. https://www.oxan.com (Accessed November 12, 2025)
U.S. Senate Homeland Security Committee (Subcommittee on Emerging Threats) - Testimony of Dr. Gina Ligon. "Terrorist Threats to International Sporting Events." Delivered November 14, 2023. https://www.hsgac.senate.gov (Accessed November 12, 2025)
"Curtis Culwell Center attack." Wikipedia. Last edited October 2025. https://en.wikipedia.org (Accessed November 12, 2025)
Diego Maloney. "FIFA World Cup 2026: Travel Tips." Riskline. Published September 10, 2025. https://www.riskline.com (Accessed November 12, 2025)
"FIFA: Safety, security of World Cup host cities is 'government' call." Reuters / Field Level Media. Published October 15, 2025. [suspicious link removed] (Accessed November 12, 2025)
Caroline Vandergriff. "Good Samaritans brutally attacked after Cowboys game." CBS News Texas. Published October 6, 2024. https://www.cbsnews.com (Accessed November 12, 2025)
J.D. Miles. "Arlington plans temporary transit system for World Cup crowds amid lack of regional mass transit." CBS Texas. Published November 7, 2025. https://www.cbsnews.com (Accessed November 12, 2025)
Matthew Adams. "Texas first responders train for World Cup worst-case scenarios." Fort Worth Star-Telegram/EMS1. Published November 1, 2025. https://www.ems1.com (Accessed November 12, 2025)
Takeaways
Corporate Security Director
Mandate Secure Transport: The 517 validated vehicle thefts necessitate the use of armored vehicles and secure, guarded parking for all VIP movements. Do not rely on public lots.
Schedule around Risk: Shift arrivals to the mid-morning window (10:00 AM – 12:00 PM) when threats decrease by 37%. Implement shelter-in-place or secure holding protocols for post-match departures to avoid the 6:00 PM – 12:00 AM high-threat window.
Close Protection Focus: Executive protection teams must be briefed on the specific risk of "smash-and-grab" operations in the Arlington Entertainment District. Valuables must never be left in unattended vehicles.
Security Analyst
Data Integration: Incorporate the monthly Base Operations updates into threat models. Pay specific attention to the "Property Crime" category, which serves as a leading indicator for the overall security environment.
Hotspot Mapping: Overlay the threat heatmap with planned VIP routes. The I-30 corridor and the specific intersections of Collins Street and Randol Mill Road should be treated as red zones for route planning.
Weather Monitoring: Integrate real-time weather data for heat index and severe storm warnings, as these environmental factors can rapidly degrade the security perimeter's integrity.
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